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RECENT DECISIONS 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW- PROCEDURE - CONSIDERATION OF INITIAL RA.TE IN 
NATURAL GAS Acr SALE CERTIFICATION - In a Natural Gas Act sale certifica-
tion proceeding1 the Federal Power Commission twice refused to issue an 
unconditional certificate, finding public convenience and necessity un-
proved because the unprecedented initial contract rate was not "shown to 
be in the public interest."2 Applicants declined to present evidence of the 
reasonableness of the initial contract rate. A commission proposal to cer-
tify at a lower rate, with increase to the contract price after twenty-four 
hours of delivery but under the public protection provisions of section 4 
of the act, was refused. After being informed that the applicants would not 
dedicate the gas to the interstate market unless an unconditional permanent 
certificate was granted at their proposed rate, the commission on rehearing 
issued an unconditional certificate to prevent loss to the interstate market, 
which was found in great need. Public utilities purchasing gas from the 
certified vendee obtained review in the Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit, which reversed the commission's decision on the ground that the com-
mission had power only to conduct a full hearing and therefore lost juris-
diction when the applicant circumscribed the scope of inquiry by refusing 
additional evidence.a On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, 
held, affirmed. Although the commission did not lose jurisdiction, it was 
error not to consider the reasonableness of the initial rate. Atlantic Re-
fining Co. v. Public Service Commission of New York, 360 U.S. 378 (1959). 
This proceeding was pursuant to section 7 (e} of the Natural Gas Act,4 
which does not expressly require consideration of the initial rate as an 
element of public convenience and necessity.5 Express rate provisions are 
1 Applicant-vendors are the Atlantic Refining Company, Cities Service Production 
Company, Continental Oil Co., and Tidewater Oil Co., known as CATCO. Their vendee 
is Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. This contract is the first significant transaction relating 
to the Continental shelf reserves below the seabed off the Louisiana coast. Moreover, the 
proposed price was "some 70% higher than the weighted average cost of gas to Ten-
nessee." Principal case at 393. 
2 Continental Oil Co., 17 F.P.C. 563 at 575 (1957). 
3 Public Service Commission of New York v. Federal Power Commission, (3d Cir. 
1958) 257 F. (2d) 717. "Congress has not given the Commission power to inquire into 
the issue of public convenience and necessity where, as here, the applicant circumscribes 
the scope of that inquiry by attaching a condition to its application requiring the Com-
mission to forego the consideration of an element which may be necessary in the formula-
tion of its judgment." 257 F. (2d) 717 at 723. 
4 52 Stat. 821 at 825 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. (1958) §717f (e). 
5 Section 7 (e) provides in part: "(e) Except in the cases governed by the provisos 
contained in subsection (c) of this section, a certificate shall be issued to any qualified 
applicant therefor, authorizing the whole or any part of the operation, sale, service, con-
struction, extension, or acquisition covered by the application, if it is found that the 
applicant is able and willing properly to do the acts and to perform the service proposed 
and to conform to the provisions of this chapter and the requirements, rules, and regula-
tions of the Commission thereunder, and that the proposed service, sale, operation, 
construction, extension, or acquisition, to the extent authorized by the certificate, is or 
will be required by the present or future public convenience and necessity; otherwise 
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found only in sections 4 and 5 of the act. Section 4 (e)6 empowers the com-
mission to institute a hearing on the reasonableness of a proposed increase 
in an existing rate, the burden of proof being on the gas company. It fur-
ther allows the commission, pending conclusion of such hearing, to suspend 
the new rate as to non-industrial consumers for a maximum of five months 
and thereafter require bond for reimbursement of so much of the increase 
as may not be shown reasonable. This section does not apply, however, to 
the filing of an initial rate.7 Section 5 (a) permits the commission on its 
own initiative to institute hearings to determine whether an existing rate 
is "unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or preferential" and to 
fix the "just and reasonable rate . . . to be thereafter observed."8 This 
section was relied upon by the commission in the instant case to protect 
the public interest with regard to price.9 However, "§5 (a) proceedings 
are notoriously long and complicated and no provision is made for even 
temporary suspension of rates or for refund of amounts received under such 
portions of rates as may ultimately be found to be unlawful."1° Further, 
under this section the burden of proof is on the government, not the gas 
company. Therefore, having previously held that "Protection of consumers 
against exploitation at the hands of natural-gas companies was the primary 
aim of the Natural Gas Act,"11 the Court finds that at least while section 5 
proceedings are "nigh interminable"12 the commission must consider in-
itial rates as an important factor in determining public convenience and 
necessity.13 It is not clear, however, whether a finding of public con-
venience and necessity must be supported by substantial evidence of a 
reasonable initial price. Dicta indicates that a finding of a "just and rea-
such application shall be denied. The Commission shall have the power to attach to the 
issuance of the certificate and to the exercise of the rights granted thereunder such 
reasonable terms and conditions as the public convenience and necessity may require." 
652 Stat. 821 at 823 (1938), 15 U.S.C. (1958) §717c(e). 
'1 The rejected commission proposal was designed to invoke this section to review what 
technically would have been an "increase" from its proposed initial price to the original 
contract price. The commission was apparently willing to forego a five-month suspension, 
but not a requirement of bond. 
8 52 Stat. 821 at 823-824 (1938), 15 U.S.C. (1958) §717d (a). 
9 Continental Oil Co., note 2 supra, at 882. 
10 Bazelon, J., dissenting in Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 
(D.C. Cir. 1958) 257 F. (2d) 634 at 649, contending that an express finding of a just and 
reasonable initial rate was necessary in certification of public convenience and necessity 
under §7 (e). 
11 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 at 685 (1954). 
12 Principal case at 389. A recent writer estimates the commission's backlog at over 
2,000 cases with consequent two to three years delay. Smith, "The Unnatural Problems of 
Natural Gas," FORTUNE, Sept. 1959, p. 120. 
13 "It was formerly the practice of the Commissioners to 'condition' the initial price 
charged a pipeline by a producer. • • • More recently, however, a majority of the Com-
missioners have taken the position that if other requirements of a certification of service 
are met, that's enough. • • ." Smith, "The Unnatural Problems of Natural Gas," FOR• 
TUNE, Sept. 1959, p. 120 at 123. 
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sonable" initial rate may not be required.14 If this is so, effective judicial 
enforcement of initial rate supervision probably will be difficult. The 
problem is delicate both because of statutory silence and because of the 
customary power of the commission to weigh for itself the various elements 
bearing on its determinations. However, if the limitation here placed 
upon gas companies in selection of initial rates does prove effective, their 
prerogatives will not unfairly be impaired. In rejecting the court of appeals' 
basis for decision the Supreme Court stated that "the filing of the appli-
cation for a certificate did not constitute a dedication to the interstate mar-
ket of the gas recoverable under these leases.''15 The applicants have com-
plete "liberty to refuse conditional certificates proposed" by the commis-
sion.16 Furthermore, in the recent Sunray Mid-Continent case17 the court 
recognized an applicant's "right to have the Commission act upon its 
application with such certainty as to allow the exercise of choice" in de-
ciding whether to dedicate.ts Hence, the commission cannot postpone the 
.consideration of initial rate forced upon it by the principal case. It re-
mains to be seen, though, whether this consideration will constitute the 
searching exploration of reasonableness usually associated with proceedings 
under sections 4 (e) and 5 (a) of the act. 
Robert Jillson 
14 "Nor do we hold that a 'just and reasonable' rate hearing is a prerequisite to the 
issuance of producer certificates." Principal case at 390-391. 
15 Principal case at 387. 
16Ibid. 
17 Sunray Mid-Continep.t Oil Co. v. Federal Power Commission, (10th Cir. 1959) 270 
F. (2d) 404. 
1s Id. at 409-410. 
